We create a new index that measures the extent of openness in capital account transactions. Despite the abundance of literature and policy analyses regarding the effect of financial liberalization, the debate is far from settled. One of the reasons for that outcome is the lack of proper ways of measuring the extent of the openness in cross-border financial transactions. We seek to remedy this deficiency by creating an index aimed at measuring the extensity of capital controls based on the information from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). This paper details how we construct the data and where our index stands in relation to the extant literature. Given the intricacy of capital controls policies and regulations, the exercise of quantifying the extent of financial openness remains a challenging task. Nonetheless, our index makes a substantial contribution in terms of its coverage of countries and time period; the data are available for 181 countries for the 1970 -2005 period.
Introduction
The world economy has enjoyed a period of remarkable tranquility since the end of the Argentina financial crisis. Nonetheless, the interest in the effect of financial globalization has not waned. Debates in policy and academic circles about the effect of financial liberalization policies on economic performance and the costs and benefits of capital controls policies continue to swirl. One reason for the lack of consensus can be ascribed to the difficulty in properly measuring the extent of openness or restrictions in cross-border financial transactions.
There is no question that it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of capital account controls. Although many measures exist to describe the extent and intensity of capital account controls, it is generally agreed that such measures fail to capture fully the complexity of real-world capital controls for a number of reasons. See Edison and Warnock (2001) , Edwards (2001) , Edison et al. (2002) , and Kose et al. (2006) for discussions and comparisons of various measures on capital restrictions. For extensive reviews on capital controls policy or financial liberalization, refer to Dooley (1996) , Eichengreen (2002), Kose et al. (2006) , and Henry (2006) . 2 The exceptions to be noted are Quinn (1997 and and Miniane (2004) (1998, 1999) . 5 Kose et al. (2006) and Rajan (2003) categorize the measures of capital financial openness de jure measures (based on IMF's AREAER); de facto measures based on price differentials such as the uncovered or real interest rate parity (Cheung, et al., 2003) and international arbitrage pricing model (IAPM) or capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) (see De Gregorio, 1998); and de facto measures based on quantities, i.e., volumes of capital flows as a ratio to GDP, such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) . A drawback of the price-based measures is that the measures, especially those based on the interest rate parity conditions, can reflect changes in macroeconomic conditions even if there is no regulatory changes on capital account transactions. Other sources for categorization of measures on financial integration and/or financial openness are Cavoli, et al. (2003) and Takagi and Hirose (2004) .
types of the controls on cross-border financial transactions in four groups; One is about the existence of multiple exchange rates; two the presence of restrictions on current account transactions; three that of restrictions on capital account transactions, and four that of regulatory requirements of the surrender of export proceeds. The third category (on capital account restrictions) or its combination with the second category (on current account restrictions) has been often used as a dummy variable for the presence of restrictions on capital account transactions (see Glick and Hutchison, 2001, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995 , among many others).
As we have discussed, the deficiencies of these dichotomous measures of capital controls are obvious; they do not measure the intensity of the controls, nor do they speak to 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
Up to 1996, we assign dummy variables for the four major categories on the restrictions on external accounts.
These variables are:
• variable indicating the presence of multiple exchange rates (k 1 );
• variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions(k 2 );
• variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions (k 3 ); and
• variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (k 4 ).
In 1996, the classification method in the AREAER changed and these four categories were disaggregated further, in an effort to better reflect the complexity of capital controls policies. 7 For the extension of the four binary classifications after 1996, we followed Mody and Murshid (2005) .
In order to focus on the effect of financial openness -rather than controls -we reverse the values of these binary variables, such that the variables are equal to one when the capital account restrictions are non-existent. Moreover, for controls on capital transitions (k 3 ), we use the share of a five-year window (encompassing year t and the preceding four years) that capital controls were not in effect (SHAREk 3 ).
Then we construct an index for capital "openness" (KAOPEN t ), which is the first standardized principal component of k 1t , k 2t SHAREk 3 , k 4t . This index takes on higher values 7 Especially, the k3 category was divided into 13 categories. See Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) We incorporate the k 1,t , k 2,t , and k 4,t variables in our KAOPEN variable instead of focusing on k 3 which refers to restrictions on capital account transactions. We believe the incorporation of k 1,t , k 2,t , and k 4,t in this index allows us to more accurately capture the intensity of the capital controls. One of the merits of the KAOPEN index is that it attempts to measure the intensity of capital controls, insofar as the intensity is correlated with the existence of other restrictions on international transactions. By the nature of its construction, one may argue that the KAOPEN index measures the extensity of capital controls because it may not directly refer to the stringency of restrictions on cross-border transactions, but to the existence of different types of restrictions. However, measuring the extensity of capital controls may be a good proxy to the measure of intensity of capital controls. This point can be made more concrete by considering a country with an open capital account. It may still restrict the flow of capital by limiting transactions on the current account restrictions or other systems such as multiple exchange rates and requirements to surrender export proceeds. Alternatively, countries that already have closed capital accounts might try to increase the stringency of those controls by imposing other types of restrictions (such as restrictions on current account and requirements for surrender of trade proceeds) so that the private sector cannot circumvent the capital account restrictions.
Some observations of the index
Our index reflects the widely held perception that the world is moving steadily toward greater and greater financial openness. Figure 1 
Comparison with other indexes
As Edison et al. (2002) and Kose et al. (2006) compare, many researchers have created indexes to measure the extent of financial openness. Our index is compared with some of the indexes of financial openness in Table 1 . One might think of the Quinn (1997 Quinn ( , 2003 index as the measure of the intensity of capital controls. Although our index may not measure the intensity of capital controls in the same way as Quinn approaches, the correlation between the Quinn index and KAOPEN, or the Chinn-Ito index, is found to be 83.9%, suggesting that KAOPEN is proxying the intensity of capital controls. 9 The correlation between the aforementioned index by Miniane (2004) , which is based on more disaggregated AREAER information on capital controls, and the Chinn-Ito index is found to be 80.2%, while that with the simple average of the 13 post-1996 capital account transactions categories is 82%. As far as we are aware, Potchamanawong (2007) constructs the only index that distinguishes between controls on capital outflows and inflows on the disaggregated basis. The coefficient of correlation between our index and the overall composite index of controls on capital inflows is 61%; the coefficient is 71% for capital outflows.
10 9 It must be noted that, as can be seen in Table 1 , the coverage of countries and time periods differ greatly across different indexes. 10 Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) calculate indices for domestic financial system, equity market, and capital account liberalization for a select number of developed and emerging market countries. The correlation with the overall composite index is 57.6% while that with the component particularly on capital
By the nature of its construction, this index is a de jure measure of financial openness because it attempts to measure regulatory restrictions on capital account transactions. Hence, this index differs from price-based de facto measures of financial openness, namely those based on the interest rate parity (UIP or RIP) approach such as Cheung, et al. (2003) or those on deviations from no arbitrage profits conditions such as De Gregorio (1998). These types of financial openness measures have their own strengths and weaknesses, so that it is difficult to rank them in terms of usefulness. Our index focuses on regulatory aspects of capital account openness. 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2005 Total Industrial Countries Less Developed Emerging Markets
concluding remarks
Note: The index is normalized with the highest degree of financial openness captured by the value of 100 and the lowest by the value of zero. 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2005 Less Developed Asia&Pacific Latin South Asia, Middle East & Africa Eastern and Central Europe Note: The index is normalized with the highest degree of financial openness captured by the value of 100 and the lowest by the value of zero
